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Initial views concerning the social nature of internationa) iaw are 
of fairly recent origin and the pace of their development cannot be describ­
ed as a rapid oncA Although the existence of international law is as old 
as the states, a very long time elapsed between the peace treaty conclu­
ded by two Mesopotamian city-states some 3.000 years И. C. and the 
foundation of the Spanish school of international law in the 16th 
century.
The four thousand five hundred years that elapsed between the two 
landmarks did not always provide favourable conditions for the develop­
ment of international law nor for its treatment from a scientific aspect. 
This particular branch of law had several flourishing periods, for example, 
over one thousand years in the East and then following the 7th centurv 
И. C. in the relations between the ancient Greek city-states. The Roman 
Empire, however, brought about a new situation. When Rome was just 
one of the innumerable city-states lying on the coast of the Mediterranean, 
it established broad contacts with the other ones that were its partners 
and it transferred its attitude of respect for the law and applied legal for­
malism both of which were so characteristic of the Roman approach to 
shaping its ties with the other fellow city-states. However, when Rome 
grew stronger and it gradually invaded the Mediterranean states to estab­
lish a huge empire in the then known world the development of inter­
national law was brought to a stop, because at that time there were no 
states left for Rome to sign an agreement with. While ' Roman law" 
made a tremendous development within the Roman Empire and laid the 
foundations of the civil law adopted by the societies of commodity predu 
cers, all the paths of progress for international law were blocked. Quite 
specifically, that was the case not only for the period while the Empire 
existed as is mentioned by László Coysóyó in his excellent historical work: 
"...following its disintegration the Roman Empire passed down, in 
international respect, its own imperial system and the related way of 
thinking to be inherited by its successors either by handing down its rea­
listic achievements and partly as a customary wav of thinking both of 
which prevailed with the successors for another thousand years or so. In
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the history of mankind the predomineance of thinking in terms of an im- 
periai system accounts, therefore, for over two thousand years."- By no 
means does Gajzágó asserts in his work that the coexistence of societies 
which were reiativeiy separated from one another in the above mentioned 
period was a notion completely unknown which ought to have been disco­
vered at a later stage. The point is. as he mentions later. that the idea of 
imperial system was or continued to be predominant in the pubtic think­
ing. in their views concerning the various pokticai and organizations! 
forms. White elaborating the point Gajzágó has in mind, above all. the 
Papacy, the Holy Roman Empire and the Isiam.
Because of its characteristic setup and dependence system feudahsm 
did not create especially fsvourab!e conditions for the progress of re!ations 
based upon equal footing, inctuding international law. between the sepa­
rate entities. It is true that certain relations established between the indi­
vidual entities of feudalism anti some of them w ere subjected to legal regu­
lation, but this process was rather reminiscent of the development of 
internal law in view of the fact that the standard feudal conditions of 
super and sub ordination had the decisive role to play in it.
So far as the other continents of the age are concerned, the pattern 
was quite similar because plans for establishing and afterwards preserving 
their own empires were in the focus of the objectives of the rulers of 
both India and China, and the absence of relations either between them or 
with Europe did not make it necessary in any form to develop some kind 
of international legal system.
In Europe, it was the age of the great discoveries that meant the end 
of the final attempt to establish an empire. Although Charles V. managed 
to be made King of Spain and Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire but 
in spite of all he. too. proved to be unable to translate his ambitious plan 
into practice. Gne obstacle was that the borders of his Empire were exten­
ded to overseas territories, a fact that rendered the practical implementa­
tion of the idea physically impossible. The fact that the age in question 
saw the appearance of the first views that can be generalized for interna­
tional law and that they emerged on Spanish soil is bv no means incidental.
The first approaches were, of course founded upon a /n?r q/' /m/ure 
¿Mi.si.s. The only task the scientist of the age had to accomplish was to ex­
plore and disclose the existing laws governing nature and to summarize 
them. An attempt to this effect was made, among others, by the represen­
tative of the Spanish school of international law to which Francisco dc 
Fi/orm and Francisco A'anres belonged in the first place. They classified 
the law created by God into the category of law of in their teach­
ings law of nature and the divine law were merged into one quite obviously 
because, as they professed, nature is nothing but the arrangement of 
things and life by God. As Suarez writes international law "is based upon 
the fact that the human race represents a certain unity in spite of the fact 
that it is divided into different nations and countries. . .and although 
each independent state, republic or kingdom constitutes by itself a per 
feet community... they cannot do without a sort of mutual assistance.
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the company of one another and relations between them for the benefit 
of achieving increased welfare and higher gains . . . For the same reason 
they are in need of a law that governs and regulates correctly their attitude 
to one another and the intercourse between the members of this society. 
In most part this is done with the assistance of law of nature, but it is not 
quite sufficient and does not quite involve everything directly. That is 
why very specific legal provisions could take root in the intercourse bet­
ween nations merely as a result of the practice adopted by the individual 
nations."3 The statements quoted above were, indeed, revolutionary ones 
in the period of establishing an empire. Because what Suarez meant was 
the society of nations and not an empire extending to the world and unity 
could be implemented by way of mutual assistance and cooperation and 
not through subordination. As regards the history of ideas, that was the 
stage at which the imperial idea was made to retire. However, the views 
outlined by Suarez continue to be revolutionary ones even during the time 
dominated by the concept of law of nature because they assert that in 
addition to the sources of law of nature there is also another source, na- 
melv the practice of the state. It is also true, however, that a couple of 
lines later Suarez adds that the law that developed in the course of this 
practice "is partly not a voluminous one and, on the other hand, it is very 
close to law of nature; moreover, it is easiest to deduce it from law of 
nature". Vitoria's opinion is quite similar. But he goes somewhat further 
than Suarez by saying that human iciM can also establish international 
law as soon as it emerges spontaneously in the majority of mankind. Need­
less to say that this is also law of nature. Suarez makes the ¡mint quite 
clear when he declares, "the right of peoples is always law of nature or 
something that stems from nature"'*. That provided the theoretical condi­
tions for a break with law of nature.
And soon the social conditions lor the break were also created. The 
period in question was the age of bourgeois development, the time of the 
establishment of the national states. In barely two decades after the ab­
dication of Charles V Jan Rodin published his work, Six livres de la Re- 
publique, which is the first ever complete elaboration of the idea of so­
vereignty. Although Bodin spoke about the prince's sovereignty but in 
practice what he outlined was the sovereignty of the state of a kind which 
is independent of the pope and the Emperor and is also independent of 
any sort of external or internal power.
So far as the question of the essence of international law is concerned, 
the next major step forward and beyond the limits of the concept of law 
of nature was taken by Crodlcs. He lived at a time when the theoretical 
foundations of the concept of law of nature were increasingly undermined 
by the new and different phenomena of social development. International 
trade becoming ever more intensive and increasing political relations 
between the states made it necessary to conclude international agreements 
in a growing number. And that was more than mere state practice, for 
the norms which had obviously been established by man could no longer be 
deduced from law of nature. Credit is due to Orotius for being the first in
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the world to make a distinction between international law deriving from 
law of nature and brought about by the human will, in the opinion of 
Grotius law of nature is the command of the sound reason while the law 
of the will can equally stem from God or from the peoples. He stated that, 
the source of law proper is to appropriately safeguard human reason and 
. . the interests of the community. There can also he another source of 
law in addition to the that natural source; and that is God's free will to 
which we have to subordinate ourselves according to the incontestable 
command of our own reason. . . . Hut since the legal provisions of each 
state are designed to serve the benefit of a particular state, certain legal 
provisions can be established under fo;mnon uyrccMca/ reue/;ed /a/ c// or 
.screw/ .s/o/c.s and they will be for the benefit of the whole and not 
merely that of individual communities. This is de.srrZ&Y/ os irderwo/ioMo/ 
/otc as distinct from law of nature/The lines quoted from Grotius contain 
the reply supplied by the Dutch jurist to the question of the nature of 
international law. And in fact his reply has continued to be the only gene­
rally accepted answer to the present (lay: basically, it has remained intact 
over the past three and a half centuries apart from the implications of 
law of nature which have been removed from it as the years have elapsed. 
The point of interest lies in the fact that nothing new has been added to 
what Grotius stated in the mid-)7th century to the present dav; all that 
has been done subsequently is confined to some modifications made from 
time to time at best. The idea laid down by Grotius is shared even bv the 
science of socialist international law.
The law of the will put forward by Grotius was later termed "positive" 
law. It was an unchallangeable sign of positivism gaining ground that 
the international lawyers of the age concentrated their efforts on exploring 
the norms that the states /acre /o o&e/TC in their relations with one another 
instead of the manner in which they .sVm/dd behave in these relations. Inter­
national lawyers then took to collecting agreements. The German scholar 
Gottfried W ilhelm LeiiuM/z was the first to compile the initial collection 
of agreements in 1693 and it could no longer be regarded as a collection of 
the rules of law of nature.
Occasionally, there were considerable detours characterizing the 
development of positivism. In the mid-19th century, for example, the 
English lawyer John HM.sfbr stated that positive law is a set of commands 
of a sovereign who has powers to enforce them. Hut in view of the fact 
that in an international community there is no such sovereign, internatio­
nal law is by no means positive law; it is merely a system of the norms of 
"positive morals" and as such it cannot be regarded as law at a ll/ The 
representatives of the CeramM posi/irig/ .sr/mo/ q/" /re;e who were based on 
Hegel's philosophy maintained that in actual fact international law is 
"external state law", in other words the extension of state law to inter­
national relations/ Such and similar views, however, never came to be 
generally accepted and the influence they exerted was rather a short-lived 
one.
Hut this does not apply to the theory of self limitation submitted
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by JcMiwcA-, a, view that continues to figure or reappear even today in most 
of the sovereignty based concepts. Jelűnek put forward the idea that the 
states, the possessors of supreme power have an absolute freedom of ac­
tion which, in case of need and by relying on similar statements bv other 
states can be subjected to self-limitation. According to his view international 
law would be embodied in concordant statements of self-limitation." The 
theory suggested by Jetiinek came under fire from many sides. His critics 
based their views principally on the thought that the partners of a state 
adopting self-limitation cannot have full confidence in that state and ex­
plained that in case a state can set limits to its freedom of action at its 
own will, it obviously has the right to lift the limitations it imposed on its 
own. In other words, there is a danger that any state can abandon its 
commitments arising from international law any time.
The theory giving promonence to the common will of states was 
designed to offer a solution to the above mentioned problem. In his book 
published in 180!) the German lawyer TWcpe/ explained that in internatio­
nal law only a will superior to that of the individual states can bring about 
norms that are obligatory for the states. Such a will can be established on 
the basis of agreement concluded by the states, and. as a result, the differ­
ent wills of the different states are actually merged into a united will. In 
1 riepcl's view the common will laid down in an agreement is not simply the 
totality of the individual wills, but it is an independent product which, 
ever since its birth, leads its own life."
In connection with this theory Ayo is (pite right in saying that inter­
national law which is based on such foundations might become completelv 
rootless since the artificially constructed will would not be associated with 
any kind of medium: either with the individual states or with a sort of 
supranational institution. It would, therefore, become a will related to no 
subject.'"
As a matter of fact common will which is distinguished from or con­
trasted with individual state will is a characteristic bourgeois democratic 
concept, because the assumption that any majority represents progressi- 
vism and social justice and that the will of the majority is the most impor­
tant scale of political values has always been the official theoretical founda­
tion of the bourgeois society. The contribution by Triepcl was, therefore, 
nothing but translating this concept into the language of international 
law. Common will, however, is embodied in the general customary law 
which is accepted by the overwhelming majority of the states and it acts 
as a support for its validity. In vain do we try to find any kind of common 
will in a bilateral agreement or even in a norm based on customary law. 
Thus Triepel created not only a will, associated with no subject while 
elaborating his concept but he also ignored particular agreements of will.
In his book written in 1902 J  also speaks of concordant will but
he adds that the source of international law is not any kind of superior com­
mon will but it lies in a basic norm which forces the state to adhere to inter­
national agreements. This basic norm is the pac/n .s-Mn/ serroMda. Anzi- 
lotti considers this basic norm as being of an objective and absolute value,
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an initial h\ pothesis which is itnpossible to prove and to which each known 
human order can necessariiv be traced back. In his opinion this does not 
mean that there wouid be no other method for laying the foundations ba­
the principie of pacta sunt servanda. The point is that any other kind of 
foundation which can be given, for example, from an ethic or poiitica! 
aspect does not beiong to the realm of the science which is confined to and 
concerned with studying international law.'' TAM-s- .4?i.";/<*;//;' discards q// 
Mwd /Ac acrcs.s'd// or ap/dhvdu'b'/y of a .socio/opira/ approarA ^or aap ///pc r//' 
approacA oa a 3oc:a/ .s-cicKce Aa-sds) Ae/ore adoM-iar/ aa//owe /o cayaye fa /Ac 
e.Kp/aaa/ioa <*</' /Afs- Adad p/ approacA. His attitude is characteristic of the 
overwhelming majority of the different legal views. The concept 
that the lawver must not go beyond the frame of legal dogmatics is carried 
through most consistently by A'r/.sca. \\ hen creating "pure theory ol 
law" he takes a position on the concept of the basic norm so that he re­
jects the agreement as well; he states that only a norm can act as the 
foundation for the obligatory nature of norms.*- Hut while Anzilotti tails 
to pay special attention to the question of where the basic norm assumes 
its obligatory nature from, Kelsen states that the basic norm is nothing 
but the norm of customary law when he says that the states must act in 
a manner they normally do. It is another question that the outstanding 
scholar does not at all stick to the analysis of legal forms isolated 
from the conditions of the society in his other w o r k s ."
In connection with this the best known Soviet international lawyer 
7'?o;AdH is quite right in stating that the concept of a basic norm sets out 
from theorems referring to law in general and to international law in parti­
cular as a closed system of its own, in spite of the fact that universal corre­
lation of phenomena is a general rule that is valid for both nature and the 
society and quite obviously, international law is not separated from the 
rest of social phenomena by any barrier that would be impossible to 
surmount." It is assumed that there is an opportunity for performing a 
complex examination. Tunkin, however, is content with drawing the above 
conclusion, and like the other socialist international lawyers remains as 
I have mentioned before, with one of the above listed theories, namely 
the theory of agreement. He goes no further than stating that it is not 
necessary for an agreement and, as a result, for the establishment ol in­
ternational legal norms that the will of the state-parties should be com­
pletely identical and that it should become a united will, for he main­
tains that in the processes of establishing norms rather conflicting wills 
are involved which, in a given case, may well have conflicting class cha­
racter. W ills of this kind, he gees on. are far from being identical ones 
and as such they cannot be merged into a united will. In spite of this, 
however, Tunkin adds, they are concordant and they are geared to­
wards their accepted as a definite rule assuming the role of a norm 
of international law." Thus the Soviet author draws a line of distinc­
tion between the "concordant" nature and "identity of wills. He 
suggest that concordance can be identified in respect of the acceptance of 
a given rule as a legal norm. He adds that in this respect will mutually
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presuppose one another but he reiterates that it is valid only in this parti­
cular respect. The agreement of a state that one or another of the norms 
be accepted as a norm of international law can invariably be achieved 
on condition that similar agreement is displayed by another state or states.
The views elaborated by Tuttkin have, in practice, been accepted by 
other socialist lawyers. His position is adopted, among others, by the work 
summarizing the results of Soviet international law published recently in 
six volumes and a number of other studies'^, and the same attitude is 
present in the latest textbook for the Hungarian law schools. "While 
domestic law expresses the will of one state", the textbook writes, "the 
provisions of international law are brought about by agreement between 
the wills of two or more states. One of the most conspicouos features of 
international law is, therefore, that this law is founded upon the concensus 
of states. . . [in spite of the fact that] the will of the states creating the 
provision of international law has different objectives; this is the situation, 
in particular, when a legal provision is established collectively by states 
with different social and economic systems".'?
It is hardly possible to raise doubts as to the principal point of the 
theorv, that is to say that international law is created as a result of agree­
ments reached by states, and no legal obligation can arise for any state 
with which it has not agreed beforehand. In the domain of international 
relations there is not a single supreme power which would have the right 
to establish obligatory norms for the subjects to adhere to without lirst 
having their agreement to this effect. Any attempt made up till nowand 
designed to impose a supranational norm-creating process (even within 
the narrow limits of a smaller group of states, as for instance, the Common 
Market) is doomed to failure. In international relations no such practice 
has as yet been established which is common to domestic law where the 
subjects are not consulted, in the majority of cases, in advance whether 
they accept this or that type of obligatory norm. In this connection the 
traditional theory of agreement is adequate to social reality: international 
social conditions and the conditions of international law built upon them 
correspond to one another. Thus the problem, in my view lies elsewhere, 
namely in the fact that the difinition of the theory of agreement discussed 
in the foregoing offers few if any opportunities for further examination, 
above all, for sociological examination: 1 mean studies wanting to penetra­
te deeper in finding out more about the realities of the society. The defi­
nition quoted above tends to treat the state in an antropomorph manner, 
to a certain extent, because the category denoted by the term 'will" is 
frequently used in connection with a personified subject such as people's 
will" or "class will", but it is not regarded as the only key notion to be used 
in the given connection. It must be noted that will is a psychological cate­
gory in the first place and, for this reason, using it in connection with the 
state which is the most complex institution of the human society may well 
lead to drawing false conclusions. The fact that the participants of an inter­
national meeting speak of behalf of states can undoubtedly make the im­
pression that they represent the will of an entity which is still to be struc-
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tured. However, it is oniy a simple social and legal fiction which can be 
suitable for serving certain objectives but not for building up a complete 
theory.
The English political scientist John Vlar/o?; is quite right in pointing 
out that, among other things, it was the traditional attitude of internatio­
nal law, the concept of the international legal subject that had the major 
role to play in the approach according to which the state was regarded as a 
single and undivided political entity.*s Whoever happens to conclude an 
international agreement whether he be the president of a state or a mi­
nister in charge, or whether the agreement involves the most important 
issues of the state concerned or an area of very little significance, the 
state will formally became Mor the subject of rights and obligations. It 
may well be that the cooperation specified in the agreement calls for the 
mobilization of the total political and economic strength of the respective 
state, but it may also be that a couple of measures to be taken by the local ad­
ministration are sufficient to fulfil the agreement. Formally, the same duty 
is involved in both cases, because the agreements are equally obligatory 
for the parties to them. However, it would be very useful to take into 
consideration an important aspect, nemely, that the subjects of the newly 
established legal relationships and those of the transnational social rela­
tionships arc very rarely identical. To put it more accurately: international 
law has fictitious subjects in almost every case. For example, when a health 
agreement is to be signed it is not the that is negotiating the provisi­
ons of the agreement with another state, but the minister in charge with 
his colleague; and even if some other government authorities are included 
in negotiations, they negotiate, after all, about a cooperation belonging to 
the range of authority of one ministry. Therefore, in such cases it is not 
one state that cooperates with another, but one central organ of state 
administration with its opposite number in another state.
The definition of the Hungarian textbook quoted above is rather 
self-contradictory even ifone thinks in terms of the category of an imper- 
sonified state. It would follow from the quote that in the course of bring­
ing about an international agreement the wills of states are designed to 
serve different objectives, but in spite of all that they can be coordinated. 
This, however, is not possible because there is hardly any action without 
a related will (apart from acts performed out of carelessness or by mistake, 
but they are far from being characteristic for concluding an agreement). 
The will of a state is either designed to conclude an agreement — and 
then it will be signed — or it is opposed to it and then there will be no 
agreement. Obviously, the authors of the textbook had in mind the idea 
that although the general political and strategic objectives of the states 
entering into international agreement with one another can be different, 
the identity oftheir interests, however, makes reaching agreement possible 
and necessary in specific cases. In such instances not the wills but the long 
term objectives are different from one another. Tunkin was aware of poss 
ible contradiction in this respect: that is why he said that the conflicting 
wills are not identical and cannot merge into a unified will either, but they
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can be concordant in respect of the acceptance of one or another legal 
norm. This, however, is not sufficient to eliminate the contradiction, since 
"concordant" wii! docs not presuppose a much lesser measure of identity 
than "identical" will. In connection with this category I must emphasize 
that it is rather unfortunate to use the term "concordant", because only 
appropriately defined wills can be concordant which are incidentally, 
what the texts of the agreements are. For this reason Tunkin uses the 
notion of will in too general a context; he thinks that there can only be a 
will concerned with long-term objectives and ignores the possible existence 
of will necessary for performing any concrete action.
It follows from what I have discussed so far that when we seek a de­
finition of the nature of international law, "agreement of the wills of 
states" cannot be regarded as an adequate starting point. Although the 
category of "agreement" would, by itself, be applicable, I think it would be 
more correct to use a concept which could widen somewhat the area to be 
studied. The fairly common idea according to which international law is 
brought about by way nyrce/aen/ between states as opposed to domestic 
law which contains the coiawands of the state rather divides the origins of 
the two legal systems, i t  suggest that there are two processes involved 
but they differe from one another in respect of quality; to study them 
simultaneously is impossible or unnecessary. In fact a unified process takes 
place whose participants are identical (the central political organs and 
institutions of the states which possess real power) and both the political 
functions and objectives of the participants are identical, too. The func­
tion of the Central organs includes, first of all, maintenance of a specific- 
system of property relations, enforcement the given political power, safe­
guarding tlie integration of the society and keeping the opposing political 
forces under control. 7?o/A /Ac .sv/.s/cw o/* doiaeA/ic /roc rear/ /Ae cs/rrA/rsAraca/ 
of rr gyg/eni of ra/erMre/ioarr/ rrr/reeMcn/.s ore /aean-s- rrf /rr/f///iay /A is /aac/irnr. 
As a matter of fact the function which was described in detail above can be 
fulfilled only on condition that the political system existing within the 
state borders operates relatively free from external disturbing factors. 
From the point of view of those in power it is, after all, much the same 
whether their power is threatened from "inside" or "outside". Dangers 
arising from outside, that is beyond the frontiers, constitute a threat to 
the same power that are defended by the centra! organs from inside. Of 
course, there is more to it than just sheer defence. In order to fulfil 
the function mentioned above the state organs also display an active 
attitude in an effort to change the environment. They try to streng­
then such social processes which are favourable for them and try to 
weaken those that are unfavourable from their point of view. The same 
applies to the other functions. The other fundamental function to be per 
formed by the leading state bodies is to organize the activities of the society 
as a whole, in particular, ensuring the conditions necessary for production. 
Within the state this function is manifested, among other things, in the 
establishment of an adequate system of economic institutions, in seeing 
that the financial balance is maintained, and so on. while in respect of
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external affairs, it is manifested in promoting participation in the inter­
national division of labour, in taking measures to protect the national 
economy, and so on. In this field, it is again necessary to resort to and use 
the means of law.
It can be concluded without elaborating the problem any further 
that, to a certain extent, we can speak of MM esseM/AA/y MMi/bna/aar/ina o/ 
/Ac cca/ra/ oryaas o/* /Ac -s/a/c.$ a ad o/' a Au-sA* idea/;'/// /a /mas a/* /Ac /acaas 
adop/ed ia /Ac coar.se o/* pe//oran'ay /Ai-s- /aac/ioa. That is why when dis­
cussing the (¡uestions of law-making I would prefer the use of a common 
notion which would be capable of including the specificities of both the 
' internal" and "external" functions. The most suitable terni to this effect 
could be dccisioa-aiaAiay, a fundamental notion as often used and studied 
by sociology. While performing their functions the central organs of the 
state continually make decisions part of which assumes a legal form. In 
this context dmac.s'/ic /aa; aad ia/craa/;oaa7 A/a- can Ac de/incd as /Ae /orw.s 
o/*decisions' wade A;/ /Ac cea/ra/ orycMMo/* /Ac ;adâ idaa/ .s7a/c.s'e;7Acr .s'cpara/c- 
/y or codec/ircA/. Naturally, this definition is not an absolutely genuine one 
but as far as I know it is available in literature on international law in 
the works of only one author. .1/cDoaya/. but he treats it only in a by-the- 
way manner and, for that matter, it is not very much elaborated.
McDouga! defines international law as a "/Aw o/ deci.sAni.s in which 
community prescriptions are formulated, invoked, and in fact applied in 
the promotion of community policies".*" However, the American author 
fails to define what he actually means by the notion of decision: he goes 
only as far as stating that "decision-making is a dynamic process in which 
decision-makers . . . are continually creating, interpreting rules and conti­
nually formulating and reformulating, applying and terminating, poli­
cies")"
The notion of decision-making concerned the broadest interpretation 
in Hungarian literature has been submitted by the sociologists //eyedasand 
/¿osyoHyi. who list the following stages as being the principal ones of de­
cision-making:"*
1. Accumulation of information promoting the recognition of the 
necessity of making a decision:
2. Those concerned recognize the need for making a decision and they 
formulate the problem on which a decision should be made;
3. They collect further information and elaborate the decision-mak 
¡ng alternatives :
4. They choose from among the alternatives (according to the authors 
this is the only stage which is commonly called decision);
5. Implementation of the decision, that is carrying it out in practice 
and controlling the execution.
Obviously the stages listed above are not formulated in a manner 
that they could directly be applied in connection with international law. 
It must be born in mind that notions supplied by sociology are associated 
with a different level of generalization. The study ! ¡¡noted, however.
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contains a statement that in reality the process that takes piacé is longer 
than what is termed decision in the common language. Even formuiating 
the issue on which a decision should he made is a sort of decision, because 
it is not indifferent a matter which particular issue or problem has been 
selected for having been regarded as one which should be settled. Moreover, 
even at the second stage the manner in which a problem is formulated al­
ready contains quite frequently the final decision because the alternatives 
offered by those preparing an issue for decision are such that only one of 
them should be preferred. It is a general experience that the content of 
decisions, so far as its principal aspects arc concerned, is established al- 
readv in the course of the preparatory stage. In the case of proposals to 
be submitted to the highest level decision must be made, as a rule, on a 
couple of questions only left open by the experts participating in the pre- 
paratorv work: as for the rest of the issues, decision is essentially made on 
them oil the lower levels. It must be noted that the opposite of this se­
quence is also true because a decision is virtually often made on the ques­
tions right at the start when the highest level formulates the "directives" 
or "guidelines". In such cases the experts are left with the job of elaborat­
ing the details only.
As has been discussed decision-making is, in fact, a longer process; 
in spite of this, however, impossible to include all the five stages enumerat­
ed by Hegedűs and Rozgonvi in this process. For example, what the two 
authors describe as "accumulations of information promoting the recog­
nition of the necessity of making a decision" can hardly be regarded as a 
constituent part of decision-making. Decision-making proper begins at 
the stage when, out of the accumulated pieces of information, the ones in 
favour of making the decision are selected. This coincides with the stage 
at which "those concerned recognize the need for making a decision and 
tliev formulate the problem on which a decision should be made."
Nor could be included the implementation and the control of decision 
or decision-making proper because they are what they are denoted by the 
respective terms: implementation and controlling implementation. It is 
possible, though, that in the course of the above two processes new decisi­
ons are made (as has been mentioned by McDougal) which boil down to 
modifying or falsifying the essence of the original decision but these 
constitute the parts already of a new decision-making process.
In an article discussing this problem Boldizsár is absolutely right
when he says that in actual fact there is no such thing as only one de­
cision if we wish to give an accurate formulation. In the reality of everyday 
life, he says, there is an endless succession of decisions from which to 
grasp or isolate one decision is the result of scientific abstraction.^- I can 
add that the same applies to law-making. Because the fact of the matter is 
that the law-maker picks out one of the series of decisions that can be 
observed. This is the one which he wishes to turn into a legal formula for 
some reason or another and for the implementation of which he intends to 
relv on the means of the technical arsenal of law. Obviously, the sociolo­
gical examinations must concentrate attention on //ns pur/icM/ur decision
THE SOCIAL NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 2M
white the manner in which the 'minor" decisions were made in the pre­
paratory stages must naturaHy be studied as wet). .
As far as the stages suggested by Hegedűs and Rozgonyi are concerned 
the ones from 2 to 4 deserve special attention to tie paid by internationa) 
taw-makers. Of them it isev'dently stage No. 4 which results, strictly speak­
ing, in the establishment of an internationa) tegat norm, for this is the 
stage at which the participants "choose from among the alternatives" — 
as the Hungarian authors put it. What is meant by this in the titeraturc on 
sociotogicat organization is a choice between two appropriated distin­
guishable atternatives but neither of them can tie absotutetv certain or 
impossib!e.23 Other opinions suggest that this interpretation is siightty of 
a mechanical nature, because it contains the assumption that in the event 
of each decision-making there are atternatives avaitabte to enabte a "free" 
choice, although a ctoser and more thorough going anatvsis of the abter- 
natives often shows that there is onty one sensibte choice, or there is no 
atternative at at). According to this view, in the norma) course of events 
the atternatives are nothing but apparent atternatives in genera) and de­
cision making is teft with the essential task of exptoring the verv action 
out of the set of actions thought to be possihte by an outsider that can 
ready be accomptishcd under optimum conditions. (Perhaps there is a 
difference of opinion at best held by the peopte participating in the deci­
sion-making as to which is the best possibte or onty atternative.)
When criticizing the above discussed position Boldizsár A'ayy ex­
plains-' that in case none of the atternatives outtined in the course of 
decision-making is certain or impossibte a selection muct be made. For if 
the "thorough going" examination of the probtem resutted in onlv otic 
sensible alternative left for the decision-makers, it means that it is //;e;'r 
cAoife or their evaluation of the alternatives. In the opposite case an a 
priori coherent order of values should be assumed which is accepted bv 
everyone even in respect of its details and all left to be done would be to 
compare it with the different alternatives in the course of decision-making. 
In reality, however, even the order of values is a matter of selection, at 
least in the sociological sense of the term (apart from the general determi­
nation of human behaviour considered from a philosophical aspect). In­
cidentally, the psyche of those participating in decision-making is not a 
system either that would tie free from contradictions. In the case of differ­
ent decisions the norms taken into consideration by the participants can 
result in different priorities. This means that even if the situations are 
identical in principle, they tend to consider one or the other as being the 
optimum one and which should, therefore, be selected. So their decision 
alternates.
Dee;.s-;oa-a;aC;ay is a process o/ acd'oa p/aaaiay a/;;'e/; /iey;ae wd/; /7m 
recoya;'/;oa o/* //;e aeed/or a; a/day a decduoa aad ead-s a d/; a c/;o;'re /cdceea 
/Ac adcraad'rc.s, a d/; //;e/ora;a/a/;oa o  ^//;c proMea; /o &e sa/nad/ed/or de- 
c;'s;oa aw/ //;e e/a/wradon o/ //;e aderandres /y;'ay ;a 6e/a eea. Compared to 
tins deedsioa proper //;e re/adre e/o.s;ay ,daye q/' //;e process ard'oa p/aa- 
a;'ay. /7;e parpo.se ri/" a /;;e/; /.s-/ose///;eae/;oa q /  d;o.se;a;-o/;ed. or//;e .seric.s q /
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/Aeir ac/iows, /Aa/ us, /Aeir AeAaiioar. The reason for describing decision as a 
relative dosing stage is that the process can begin all over again and a 
new decision can modify the previous one. However, there is still an em­
inent of stabiiitv in the decision — as opposed to closing a simple purpo­
sive human behaviour — since the decision once made rcsai/.s in reia/ice 
s/aAiii/y in the relations between the decision-makers and those to whom 
the decision is addressed, or in the relations between one another of those 
to whom the decision is referred. The stabilizing effect is, of course, largely 
enhanced in case the decision is transformed into a legal form. Namely, 
in vain does domestic law or even international law offer a number of 
opportunities for modifying or terminating the individual norms, this is 
evidently a much more difficult procedure than when a decision is made 
under informal conditions and is also implemented in an informal manner.
Two types of decisions can be distinguished: one is the coordination 
type and the other is the subordination kind of decision. The decision 
of coordiym/ioa type is designed to coordinate the actions and behaviours of 
people who are at the same level of the hierarchy. In such cases the de­
cision-makers do no more than making a decision on shaping cooperation 
between themselves in a specific manner (for example, company managers 
decide to cooperate in production). In the event of the saAordian/cd type 
of decision those positioned higher in the hierarchy direct the activities of 
those subordinated to them (the company managers give instructions to 
their own employees). The two types of decisions naturally overlap each 
other in several respects. Quite a few coordination type of decisions con­
tain subordination type of decisions since if the company managers make 
a decision on production cooperation they practically make a decision at 
the same time also on the manner in which it should be implemented by 
the employees subordinated to them. Formally, this type of decision is as 
much of the coordination type as. for instance, the decision made bv the 
members of a working team on the division of they labour. In the decisions 
ol the subordination type, however, generally determine not only the 
behaviour of the people expected to carry them out but also the own be­
haviour of the decision-makers.
The doaies/ic law serves as a framework for decisions of the subordi­
nation type because since the central state organs attempt to guide the 
behaviour of persons and organizations living in the territory of the state 
by relying on the law for assistance.
However, when the individuals and the organizations carrv out ac­
tions which go beyond the borders of a state, in other words when social 
relations are established between the subjects of one state and those of 
another state, at a certain level of the intensity of these relations the ne­
cessity of coordinating decisions on an international level will invariably 
arise. 1 his is the stage at which the ia/eraa/ioMa/ roordian/ioa of dcri.sioas of 
/Ae saAordiaa/ioa type /aAe.s p/are. TAc objective is //¡a? /Ac s/a/es sAoaid Ac 
caaA/cd /o sAape /Aeir doiaes/ic sys/eia of yoreraiay /Ae AeAarioar of/Aeir ow n 
ri/bcw.s b; /¡nraioay ¡' ¡/A /Aa/ of /Ae o/Aer s/a/es. /a  o/Aer ¡cords, /Acre sAoa/d
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&e r?;A.s o/ AeAatiOM?' aAicA are ei/Aer idc/;/Av// or Aar/z/nnizcd ui/A n//c aan/Acr 
ia order /o appA/ /Ae?M /o o// /Ac .sz/Ajcc/.s o/'/Ae iM/er/aAio/K*;/ .socio/ rcA//io//.s'.
What is meant is not oniy to govern the behaviour of the individuals 
and their organizations that lie outside the central power institutions of 
the state. The need for coordination arises, of course, also in connection 
with the activities carried on by the central institutions themselves (thus, 
for example, when ensuring the diplomatic rights and immunities, the 
states concerned must coordinate the measures which are to be taken by 
the respective central organs of state administration).
A similar distinction serves as a starting point for László /bay/. The 
late Hungarian international lawyer made in one of his earlier works a 
distinction between the Aw of co?M-MMMM?N and the /an- of proMMges. In his 
opinion, international law' can be classified into the category of the law of 
promises, but it remains to be a conditional type of law because, as he 
puts it, "its validity is made to be dependent on the other state making a 
promise, too, as to what its behaviour is going to be."-s In fact, internatio­
nal law-making actually includes an element of promise as well, because 
all the parties concerned make a promise that their behaviour w ill follow a 
specific line. The "decision of the coordination type", however, can better 
express the essential point considering the fact that the notion of decision 
includes the element of undertaking a certain responsibility, too (that is to 
say, the parties make a commitment that they will carry out under any 
conditions what is included in the decision). At the same time, a promise 
can be cancelled unilaterally. It is also much more fortunate to use the 
word "decision" because neither the word "command" nor the word 
"promise" presupposes that the two of them have anything in common, 
although, as has been pointed but, both domestic and international law 
making are essentially identical processes.
It is only a specific characteristic of international law that it tends to 
present decisions in which element of the subordination type are predomi­
nant as decisions of the coordination type. The best examples on hand to 
this effect are the peace treaties. For in this case the victor has the right 
to make a decision to be applied to the defeated party and considering 
its essence such a type of decision reveals hardly any difference compared to 
decisions made by a supreme power within the state ami valid within its 
borders. In a case like this the parties' behaviour is hardly coordinated 
because what is expressed in this state of affairs is a dcarcut subordination 
of the defeated party. For quite obvious reasons, however, both parties 
(the defeated one as well) insists on the idea of equality w hich is. naturally, 
far from the real situation. The situation is much the same in the case of a 
number of other kinds of decisions which are termed by international legal 
terminology as "unequal treaty".
But to come back to the statements made by .l/cDoi/ycd, the American 
author does not think that the essence proper of international law would 
lie in the decisions made on cooperation. In his study I referred to earlier 
he explains that international decisions are designed to allocate and real­
locate raÍMe.s.-6 He argues that the processes taking place in the world
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involve a struggle between demands and counter-demands. There is a 
shortage of values in the world; for that matter the decisions made concern 
the manner in which the values available but being of short supply should 
be reallocated. In his interpretation the demands are made to allocate 
and reallocate power as well as material, cultural and political values and 
the establishment of international law means an end to the struggle bet- 
ween demands and counter-demands. Internationa! law would, according 
to the above interpretation, record and fix the allocation of A'alues bet­
ween the states for a definite period.
However. McDougal's idea would suggest the acceptance of a some­
what static image of the world. It is true that in the international scene 
there are. in fact, such decisions which are concerned merely with the allo­
cation or reallocation of the available values. The best possible examples to 
this are the border treaties because of the large group of assets it is the 
territory that is not available in unlimited quantities and this will continue 
to be the case in the future as well. Treaties on the spheres of influence 
used to be of the same nature, for they in fact included the actual alloca­
tion of economic and political power. Today, however, it is less and less 
characteristic of the decisions made on the international plane to have 
such a content. McDougal ignores the development made over the past 
few decades which is characterized by the unprecedented broadening of 
wopewdoM between the individual nations. Cooperation is still invariably 
regulated in the course of confrontation between demands and counter­
demands. but during the process the point at issue is the di/iminic rather 
than the static allocation of values in the majority of cases. This can be 
experienced particularly well in the case of the decisions made within the 
economic integrations, but even a simple custom agreement can serve as a 
good example for dynamic allocation (as a matter of fact establishing 
custom duties in a coordinated way means increasing advantages for both 
the producers and consumers living within the territory of either of the 
contracting states).
W hat has been discussed so far can render irrelevant the centurv old 
debate on the re/udoM.s ¿e/w-eeM in/crim/imm/ /air. Since
international law is made by the same state organs as domestic law and 
that international law, for its most part, is designed to coordinate the sub- * 
ordination type of decisions made by these organs, the question of whether 
domestic or international law should be applied in the event of a conflict 
between the two of them can no longer have a //icore/ica/ importance.
As is well known, two conflicting views were developed earlier in 
connection with this problem wit Inn the nioMi-s/h' theory. One view suggest­
ed that in the case of conflict international law should be applied instead 
of domestic law, while the other opinion called for the application of do­
mestic law. According to the dMo/i-s/ theory the domestic and international 
systems of laws had nothing to do with one another. It would go beyond 
the scope of the present study to analyse in some detail these theories but 
it has to be made clear that what is involved here is nothing more than a 
question of /eyu/ /cc/rniyiie. For in case someone is of the opinion that
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international taw should be preferred at the expense of domestic taw wilt, 
by no means, have in mind any sort of violation of national sovereignty 
which is a point so frequently discussed in the different textbooks. To a 
given state only that particular norm of international law will apply 
which it accepted earlier in one form or another (for instance, as custo- 
marv law or under an agreement). Preference for international law as 
against domestic law means only priority given to OMC of the decisions 
made by the central organs of a state as against o//?er decisions made by 
the same organs. Thus there are no external forces that have made a 
decision which must be implemented by the domestic subjects : the point is 
that decisions made by the organs of the same state ran counter to one 
another for some reason. It is quite evident that international law can 
never be regarded as some sort of "external" law for a state or its citizens. 
It is quite another matter that maximum legal security must be provided 
for the individuals and the organizations of a state ; this can only be achieved 
if they are told absolutely accurately the norms that apply to them in­
cluding those of international law. This practice is adopted and adhered 
to by the states which have accepted the idea of priority given to inter­
national law and adopt it in practice appropriately by publicising the 
treaties and agreements from time to time. (A practice of this kind was 
virtually indispensable in the case of an organization like the European 
Communities which makes an enormous number of decisions successively.)
What has been said in the forgoing applies also to the view prefering 
the priority of domestic law. In the event of a conflict between domestic 
and international law. the case will again that two decisions made by the 
same central organs of a state are running counter to one another, and 
priority provided for domestic law will perhaps be favourable for the 
individual citizens but hardly for the state they belong to. Because the 
state will be left with the unpleasant consequences of the violation of 
international law to deal with (since preference for the domestic law in­
variably means non-fulfilment of international legal obligations).
As far as the dcoiis? concept is concerned its supporters set out from 
a false assumption when they argue that the two legal systems exist inde­
pendently of one another. As has beenshownintheforegoingthe situation is 
* just the opposite, since the two legal systems, the monistic and the dualist 
are similar, but they take different forms for preventing the same social 
phenomenon and there is a close relationship between them. It is, there­
fore, hardly possible that the essence of dualist concept would correspond 
to the "socialist view", a point asserted by the present Hungarian univer­
sity textbook on international law.-' In an age characterized by the steady 
intensification of the internationalization of social relationships it would 
correspond more favourably to the socialist view if the individual states 
made the implementation of their decisions of international implication 
as simple as possible; to facilitate this approach priori??/ ,s7;o?;/d Ac y ire?; 
?o irderMo/ioMoi io?c which is most likely to appear to be the most convenient 
form of the legal technique.
Incidentally, not all of the international decisions assume an inter-
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national legal form. There can also be absolutely informal decisions which, 
although made, are not recorded in any form ; nevertheless the parties 
involved do not hesitate to implement them. There may also be such 
decisions which, though recorded, are not desired by the parties con­
cerned to be raised to the status of legal provisions. Written interna­
tional legal norms are only created in case the nature of the decisions 
made and the interests of the decision-makeres call for the formulation 
of rules on the highest level. This takes place, above all, in the following 
cases :
1. ifit is justified by the importance of the decision, its specific nature, 
or the high number or complexity of the patterns of behaviour determined 
in the decision:
2. in case the decisions are intended to be effective for a longer period;
3. when it is necessary that the decisions should be known by many 
people in an authentic form.
The extent to which formalism has been introduced is of such a degree 
that in certain cases, especially in the international organizations, there 
are separate (procedural) norms to be applied even to the process of making 
tlecisions. in addition, the specific structure and formulation of norms, 
their extremely high number and the clarification of relations between 
the different norms containing decisions made at different places and on 
different levels call for such sophisticated and special knowledge of inter­
pretation which make it imperative to set up an independent professional 
staff which is specialized for the job.
The majority of decisions assuming the forms of international law do 
not as yet arise from within an organized framework. For the time being 
a broad scope is still provided for bilateral and multilateral negotiations 
and the traditional methods in general. It is a fact that the role being 
played by the international organizations keeps increasing in universal 
human cooperation and an increasing number of decisions are made as a 
result within the framework of an organized and appropriately regulated 
process. As is stated by Kálmán KaVcAÚr the organization can actually be 
regarded as a machinery serving the purposes of making decisions on vari­
ous levels and of implementing them (which, eventually, leads to making 
a new series of decisions on a lower leve l) .-s It is ijuite evident that the 
decision-making in an organized way increases the rationality and efficacy 
of the decisions as compared to the non-organized and "diplomatic" way. 
One of the most important stages in the development of international 
cooperation was the appearance of the organizational forms of state ad­
ministration and bureaucracy just like in the internal development of the 
states. In connection with this the conclusion of HT6er is valid; he 
maintains that a bureaucratic organization which has its own well-designed 
hierarchy, which operates on the basis of spheres of authority specified 
accurately and defined universally by the relevant rules laid down in ad­
vance, a buildup which is characterized by advanced methods of ad­
ministration and writing, in which highly specialized activities are carried on
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by welt-trained and specialized people who want to make a "career" 
within the organization, is superior to any other types of decision-making 
even from a /crAwira/ viewpoint."P On the international scene it is the 
organizational form possessing a well built up and advanced bureaucratic 
machinery which can be considered as being the most suitable means of 
organizing the activities of the society to the optimum, of making the 
most rational decisions that are practically possible within the shortest 
possible time and with the least amount of labour invested and of resolv­
ing and eliminating the conflicts that have arisen on a most easy wav. It is 
presumable, says Lawrence <S'r/aaMw?aw that an organization can be re­
garded as an advanced one to the extent to which the decision-making 
powers are transferred to the level of the bureacuratic character; in case 
the normative form of decisions in an organization is not diplomatic 
negotiation but the administrative problem-solving, we can alreadv 
speak of a change and the adaptation of the international system.^" No 
doubt there is an amount of exaggeration in this view since as long as we 
continue to live in an age of decentralized international structure, a consi­
derable proportion of the decisions especially those having much to do 
with power and politics will continue to be made in the traditional manner, 
that is to say in an informal fashion which is still assuming the form of 
diplomatic negotiations in which only the national bureacuratic methods 
:md not the international ones will have a role to play. However, the develop­
ment will be manifested in an increase in the proportion of organized 
decision-making.^*
The last question to be answered is or wo/ //a* crca/iow o/* rw.s/o-
7M<37i/ /a?c caw /<c iw/crprc/cr/ a.s- a?: iw/erwa/iowa/ dee;'.s';ow-;wa/';'w</. In the 
realm of international relations customary law continues to go strong in 
certain areas in spite of the fact that the individual states and the inter­
national organizations are making substantial efforts to switch over to the 
practice of written law completely. At the same time there are areas in 
which customary law is still produced.
At first sight it is extremely difficult to interpret the repeated occurr­
ence of a behaviour and the legal conviction (opinio iuris) attached to it 
— according to which a certain behaviour must be displayed from now on 
in the relations between the two parties concerned as an international 
decision. In my view, however, even this is a sort of a decision but the 
process of decision-making assumes a specific form. Considering the origins 
of customary law Max H'e&r states that "the sheer fact that certain pro­
cesses are recurrent, that is they occur regularly irrespective of whether 
they are natural events or actions which follow from the routine operation 
of the human body and organism, or from subconscious imitation or from 
adjustment to the external living conditions, promotes these processes to 
be raised to the status of normative commands within a verv short time. '- 
Discussing the problem /'e.srM'a adds that "the idea that certain 
methods of action have an obligatory nature" stems from the actual re­
gularity and the accepted customs".^ Regularity or the repeated occur­
rence of a behaviour can give rise to such ea:pef/a/i'ow.s among the parties
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that the other side wi!) most certainly display the same behaviour in 
the future. In attempting to find an expianation to the question Weber 
sets out from the prevailing economic conditions, or more specifically, 
from the nature of the exchange of goods. The idea that the other party 
will act as expected, is brought about in the parties while regularly ex­
changing goods. Weber states that a party intending to exchange goods 
with the other one can rely safely on the circumstance that it is his partner's 
egoistic interest to maintain this relationship.^
Thus the essential point is that the interested parties shape their 
behaviour in a specific way and ?ri/A <7 view /o eucA o/Aer. This calls for 
decisions to be made on the level of both the individuals and the central 
state organs, decisions that are made independently of one another but 
which are of identical content. However, the fact that the content is identi­
cal does not mean by itself that it is obligatory to adhere to a given be­
haviour. It is also necessary that subsequent decisions made, perhaps, at a 
much later date should clearly be founded upon the preceding ones in­
cluding, naturally, the decisions made earlier by the partners. In addition, 
it is also necessary to achieve mutual but tacit consensus as to the decisi­
ons that will follow will be made as the form of application of the existing 
normative rule. Thus the specific feature of the birth and application of 
customary law lies in the fact that the series of decisons leading to MMiAiMy 
Aiw is gradually transformed into a series of ¿wp/eiMCM/iiiy the former de­
cisions although the content of decisions remains essentially unchanged 
in the meantime.
There is only one difference between making written and unwritten 
international legal norms: while the written international legal norms are 
the results of thepuid cowi/MOM decisions made by central state organs, 
the unwritten norms arc the products of decisions made aepura/e/y Aid iri/A 
reynrd /o /Ac o/Aer par/lea invoiced. It is, of course, a different matter that 
there are fundamental differences between the other characteristics of 
the two types of norms, in particular as to the degree to which they are 
applicable. Compared to the relatively high level of formality of the first 
type, the second one is of an absolutely informal nature and, for that 
matter, it can never be known completely nor can it be explored fully; 
moreover, doubts can be raised any time as to the existence of the majo­
rity of its provisions. No wonder that much less has been done to the 
present day in the field of the empirical study of unwritten international 
norms than with regard to the written ones.
If the problem lay merely in the simple fixing that is writing down 
a provision of customary law, this would possibly not be an independent 
decision as such since that move took place already in a previous stage 
of contacts between the states. Hut in the proper sense it has to be con­
sidered a decision, in the majority of cases, if no more is done than the 
selection of the existing provisions of customary law. Formulation in writ­
ing is, incidentally, such a process in the course of which the parties ne­
cessarily revalue, modify, broaden or unify the provisions that are too 
vague, contradictory or whose content is a matter of dispute. As a result,
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a re!ative!v new decision is made. This applies, in particular, to the com­
prehensive condifications carried out in one or another field of internatio­
nal law. In actual fact formulation in writing meant a special form of 
decision in international relations which corresponded to the requirements 
of modern administration. Switching over from the unwritten to the written 
formulation takes place when the parties make a decision on cooperation 
in the future. In other words, they want something more than what has 
been customary and routine and they wish to act in a new fashion. To 
this end a real decision must be made because it is no longer permissible to 
rely on the old practice. Customary law is a thing, or, best of all,
the pace of its development is very slow. Only a regular, systematic and, 
in particular, well organized kind ol decision-making is ensuring a dömao/f 
development.
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D IE  SO ZIA LE NATÚR DES VÖ LK ERRECHTS
von
D R . LÁ SZLÓ  V A L K Í 
(In h a lt)
I. Die E n tw ick lu n g  des rech tsph ilosophischen  D enkens ü h er d ie N a tú r  tics V ölk ir- 
]-echts. 2. D as V ölkerrecht als F o rm  des in te rn a tio n a len  D ecision-M aking. 3. D ie N a tú r  des 
vö lkerrech tlichcn  D ecision-M aking: Die K o o rd in a tio n  d é r Subord ina tionsbesch lüsse  tier 
zent m ien M achtorganen . 4. D as P rob lem  des vö lkerrech tlichen  G ew onheitsrech ts u n d  tier 
tnon istischen  u n d  dualistischen  A uffassung.
О БЩ ЕС Т В Е Н Н А Я  ПРИ РО ДА  М ЕЖ Д У Н А РО Д Н О ГО  ПРАВА
(Содержание)
1. Развитие правотеоретических размышлении о природе международною 
нрава. 2. 'Международное право как форм международного принятия решении. 
3. Природа международного принятия решении: Координация субординационных 
решении центральных органон власти интересованных государств. 4. Проблемы .меж­
дународноправового обычая и монистической-дуалистической теории.
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